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TORTS-LIABILITY OF Fooo MANUFACTURER To ULTIMATE CONSUMER

- Plaintiff was injured by biting into a fishhook imbedded in a plug of chewing
tobacco bought from an independent dealer and manufactured by defendant.
There was evidence that another person had discovered a foreign particle in
another plug made by defendant, but he did not know the exact identity of the
substance. Held, that while the plaintiff's injury alone cannot raise an inference
.of negligence, the additional evidence of the second incident was sufficient to
present the question to the jury, which found for the plaintiff. Caudle v. F. M.
Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N. C. 105, 16 S. E. (2d) 680 (1941).
Despite any lack of privity, a manufacturer of goods imminently dangerous
to human life is regularly held liable to the ultimate purchaser for injuries sustained as a result of defects in his products.1 Falling within this rule are articles
intended for human consumption,2 including chewing tobacco. 3 Since the recognition of this special treatment, there has been a tendency by the courts to extend
the responsibility of the food manufacturer beyond that of merely exercising due
care. 4 Today, a growing minority holds the manufacturer liable on an implied
warranty as to the wholesomeness of his product,5 and most of the courts which

1 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 120 F. 865; Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal.
(2d) 688, 52 P. (2d) IOO (1936); Heindirk v. Louisville Elevator Co., 122 Ky. 675,
92 S. W. 608 (1906).
2 Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Assn., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95 (1912);
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co.,
171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916). Also see annotations cited in note 1, supra.
3 Corum v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171 S. E. 78 (1933);
Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918). Contra:
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W. 1009 (1915).
4 For an outline of the development of the attitude of the courts, see ]?ROSSER,
ToRTs, § 83 (1941).
.
5 Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932); Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920). See also PROSSER,
ToRTS 688 (1941); 21 MINN. L. REV. 315 at 322 (1937).
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RECENT DECISIONS

still demand a showing of negligence allow the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to be
applied freely. 6 In the group of cases involving injuries resulting from the consumption of foods which are sealed by the manufacturer and not opened until in
the hands of the ultimate purchaser, 7 North Carolina appears to be the only state
which both disallows the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and consistently denies that the discovery of a deleterious substance, without more, warrants the inference of negligence. 8 The court seems to have arrived at this
position through an unfortunate misinterpretation of one of its own decisions.9
6
See Feezer, "Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products:
Defective Automobiles," 37 MICH. L. REV. l at IO (1938). For cases not allowing
the doctrine, see MELICK, THE SALE OF FooD AND DRINK 275, note 16 (1936), and
49 A. L. R. 592 (1927).
7
This excludes cases involving bursting containers, e.g., Wheeler v. Laurel
Bottling Works, I I I Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916); and nausea resulting merely from
sight of foreign matter in foods, e.g., Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289,
236 N. W. 310 (1931).
8 In Georgia the court cannot instruct the jury as a matter of law that they may
infer negligence, but it is for the jurors to decide for themselves whether or not they
would be authorized to draw an inference. This differentiation, however, seems to be
too minute to have any practical effect. Moore v. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co., l 80
Ga. 335, 178 S. E. 711 (1934). Massachusetts has allowed the accident to create an
inference of negligence although denying any application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Tonsman v. Greenglass, 248 Mass. 275, 142 N. E. 756 (1924). The decision
seems anomalous in view of the fact that it had been well established in the state that
the doctrine raised only an inference. Graham v. Badger, 164 Mass. 42, 41 N. E. 61
(1895). In New York, where the force of the doctrine is not quite clear, Duhme v.
Hamburg-American Packet Co., 184 N. Y. 404, 77 N. E. 386 (1906), says the doctrine raises an inference, while Ferrick v. Eidlitz, 195 N. Y. 248, 88 N. E. 33 (1909),
speaks of a presumption. One court has said it will not apply the doctrine to cases
where the deleterious substance is something in no way involved in the preparation of
the food. Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. S. 798 (N. Y. C. Mun. Ct. 1916). This
holding, however, does not seem to have prevented later courts from at least inferring
negligence under such circumstances. Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., (App. Div. 1917)
167 N. Y. S. 562; Rosenswaike v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., (App. Div. 1919)
175 N. Y. S. 828. Rhode Island refuses to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine but
does allow the mere finding of deleterious substances to create an inference of negligence without the aid of other evidence. Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50
R. I. 45, 144 A. 884 (1929). The distinction results from the fact that the doctrine
creates a presumption, rather than a mere inference, of negligence. Ellis v. Waldron,
19 R. I. 369, 33 A. 869 (1896). Although Tennessee denies the application of the
doctrine, it does allow the jury to infer negligence when it appears that the deleterious
substance was in the food when it left the custody of the defendant. Yates v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 14 Tenn. App. 7 (1931). This would seem to include the majority
of the sealed-food cases. Of those jurisdictions which have directly decided the matter,
Scotland alone appears to agree with North Carolina. Mullen v. Barr & Co., [1929]
Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 461, [1929] Scot. L. T. 341, digested in 2 MEws, DIGEST OF ENGLISH CASE LAW, 2d ed., (Supp. 1925 to 1935), col. 1727.
9 In the first North Carolina food case, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine-which only
permits an inference in that state, Womble v. Merchants' Grocery Co., 135 N. C.
474, 47 S. E. 493 (1904)-was not applied because there was no real showing of
foreign matter in the food. Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. E. 464 (1926).
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The only effect of this stand, however, is that occasionally it prevents the case
from going to the jury when there is no other showing of negligence.10 Once it
reaches the jury, the particular circumstances of the accident may be given decisive evidentiary weight whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is employed.11 In the typical sealed-food situation, direct indications of negligence are
inaccessible to the plaintiff. Consequently, in North Carolina a plaintiff must
rely almost exclusively on other sales of unwholesome foods by the defendant as
circumstantial evidence of failure to exercise due care. Ordinarily, to be relevant,
the other instances must be similar in nature and occur about the same time.12
In the principal case there was no showing that the alleged foreign elements involved in the two injuries were similar in any way, nor that they were imbedded
in plugs which were produced by the defendant at about the same time. In fact,
as was pointed out in the dissenting opinion, even the evidence that there was
another mishap appears inadequate.13 Nevertheless, on the basis of this additional
evidence, the court let the case go to the jury, which in reaching its verdict may
have given little or no weight to the testimony of the discovery by the second
purchaser. Thus, in what appears to be a marked transgression of the ordinary
rules of evidence, the court effectually, though not expressly, approaches an
adoption of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. This case may introduce a new attitude
by the North.Carolina court toward the food manufacturer, and may foreshadow
a trend whereby the court will allow such cases to go to the jury on the ground
that one incident alone raises an inference of negligence.
This was merely in conformance with the regular rules of res ipsa loquitur requiring
evidence of what caused the injury. HARPER, TORTS 186 (1933). However, in Perry
v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N. C. 175, 145 S. E. 14 (1928), this was
interpreted to mean that the doctrine could not apply to any food cases, whether or not
there was actual evidence of the deleterious substance.
10 See Carpenter, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 10 So.
CAL. L. REv. 166 at 171 (1937); Niles, "Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur," 7 N. Y. UNIV,
L. Q. 415 at 417 (1929).
11 See Heim, "Res lpsa Loquitur," 63 OHio L. BuL. 369 at 372 (1918).
12 Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582
(1935).
18 Merely describing what appears to be foreign matter without identifying it is
not sufficient evidence. Tickle v. Hobgood, 216 N. C. 221, 4 S. E. (2d) 444 (1939).

